- Department of Philosophy
158 Harmon Dr
Northfield, VT 05663 - 978-810-7129
Brian R Glenney
Norwich University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- 17th Century & Early Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of perception, Philosophical Psychology, Leibniz, Modes of Perception, and 6 moreEarly Modern Philosophy (Descartes, Skateboarding, Urban street Skateboarding Politics, Perception, Molyneux's Question, and Skateboarding and Skate Cultureedit
- I finished my BA in Philosophy at University of Washington in 1999. I then studied for my MLitt at the Department of ... moreI finished my BA in Philosophy at University of Washington in 1999. I then studied for my MLitt at the Department of Philosophy , University of St. Andrews/Stirling. My PhD was awarded in 2007, for a dissertation entitled Molyneux's Question Answered!
Topics I'm currently working on include sensory perception, particularly shape. I have written some papers on ancient and modern accounts of perception, particularly on Adam Smith, and how they anticipate some current findings in the cognitive sciences.edit
Molyneux’s question, whether a newly sighted person might immediately identify tactilely familiar shapes by sight alone, stands accused of “ocularism” and “testimonial injustice” for hypothesizing about people with blindness. I present... more
Molyneux’s question, whether a newly sighted person might immediately identify tactilely familiar shapes by sight alone, stands accused of “ocularism” and “testimonial injustice” for hypothesizing about people with blindness. I present these arguments and affirm their concerns, arguing for a novel approach of accepting the reports of people with blindness as credible based on recent work in the philosophy of disability. In doing so, we can credit two new answers by people with blindness to the over three-hundred year history of Molyneux’s question by Thérèse-Adèle Husson (1825) and Pierre Villey (1930).
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This research argues that the spaces of skateboarding are hybrid. This is evidenced by not only the construction of numerous skateparks throughout the world, and their incorporation of design elements from the city, but the exclusion of... more
This research argues that the spaces of skateboarding are hybrid. This is evidenced by not only the construction of numerous skateparks throughout the world, and their incorporation of design elements from the city, but the exclusion of skateboarders from urban spaces through hostile architecture. More specifically, skateparks, which are unique among sport facilities, are shown to be evolving hybrid places in a continuing dialogue with the city under which they are geographically and politically contained.
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Skateboarding poses a unique case study for considering the place of sport in human activity. The bulk of skateboarding scholarship argues that skateboarding is largely a subversion of rule governance, a view difficult to square with... more
Skateboarding poses a unique case study for considering the place of sport in human activity. The bulk of skateboarding scholarship argues that skateboarding is largely a subversion of rule governance, a view difficult to square with common and popular rule-governed skateboarding competitions, now including the Olympics. We attempt to resolve this tension by arguing for a kind of pluralism: skateboarding's engagement in rule-governed competition is distinctly subversive, yielding the claim that skateboarding is both sport and subversion. This pluralism is examined in an " ecological " framework of emergent activities defined by push-pull interactive relationships between skateboarders and their environment that change the meaning of their spaces—whether domestic, urban, or competitive—to spaces that are both wild and spontaneous. We conclude with reflections on how skateboarding provides understanding of sport in the space of ecological meaning.
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In this paper, I develop Spinoza's theory of perceptual error by discussing his astounding claim that we correctly imagine the sun to be "about 200 hundred feet from us." I argue that Spinoza's account of "doubt" allows for two... more
In this paper, I develop Spinoza's theory of perceptual error by discussing his astounding claim that we correctly imagine the sun to be "about 200 hundred feet from us." I argue that Spinoza's account of "doubt" allows for two simultaneous yet contrary cognitive states: a more adequate intellectual judgment of the sun as distant, and an inadequate idea of the sun's near affect: the set of emotional states and behavioral dispositions associated with the sun as close. I conclude that Spinoza's account of misperception correlates well with our own incongruent two-mindedness in perceptual experience, an advantage yet to be exploited in the contemporary study of philosophy of perception.
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Just as great writing upends rules of grammar, or great scientific discoveries exceed the bounds of scientific methodology, so too is great sport made when the rules by which it is defined are subverted. From Maradona’s “Hand of God”... more
Just as great writing upends rules of grammar, or great scientific discoveries exceed the bounds of scientific methodology, so too is great sport made when the rules by which it is defined are subverted. From Maradona’s “Hand of God” (Tamburrini, 2001), Nelson’s “Hack-a-Shaq” (Skinner 2011), and Perry’s “Spitball” (Lehman 1981), to most recent moments: Kam Chancellor’s leap over the offensive line to block a field-goal and John Wall’s “yo-yo” or “extended” dribble, there are numerous sport ‘moments’ or ‘cases’ that exemplify sport at its best by subverting normal rules of play, where a participant undermines established game play in a way that demonstrates the limits of rule for controlling play. The claim defended here is that the subversion of rules is not just the basis of making great sport, but is intrinsic to the play of sport itself and should be counted part of a definition of sport. I motivate this argument with the clear example of subversion in sport from the fringe sport skateboarding, which provides a window into self-critical aspects of sport as a rule-governed activity. I then contrast this sport as subversion claim with traditional ‘formalist’ theories of sport, which define sport by its constitutive rules—rules without which the sport would not exist (Suits 1978). Though I am not the first to discuss a subversive definition of sport (Malaby 2007), this paper is unique in that it presents subversion as a kind mutualism—where sport is a mutual quest for human excellence (Simon et al. 2015: 47). I conclude by applying this ‘subversive’ definition of sport to standard theoretical problems in the philosophy of sport: What makes sport unique? Why is there significant interest in being sport participators and spectators? What makes sport a valuable human activity?
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An effective form of experiential learning for undergraduate independent study courses is to focus student learning with a single research goal: submitting an article for presentation in a professional conference or publication in a... more
An effective form of experiential learning for undergraduate independent study courses is to focus student learning with a single research goal: submitting an article for presentation in a professional conference or publication in a professional journal. This essay argues that learning emerges organically in this pedagogy, simulating the discovery of ideas and their articulation involved in normal academic research. A description of two such independent study courses framed in the context of Kuhn’s theory of conflict and discovery provide evidence of this “emergent learning,” where chaotic/disorderly learning conditions led to both professional presentations and publications. Both courses relate to a project to change the ubiquitous ‘disability’ symbol (The International Symbol of Access) from a static to an active depiction of people with disabilities, with the first course leading to the genesis of a street art campaign and the second evolving the project to state-sponsored advocacy.
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The aim of this chapter is to propose an account of sensory perception from the known writings of Adam Smith, chiefly his juvenile work, “On the External Senses.”
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Our paper addresses the ‘middle-blind’ status of the man from Bethsaida whom, according to Mk 8.22–26, Jesus heals in two phases. Drawing on observations from modern philosophical psychology and from ancient Greek and Jewish perspectives... more
Our paper addresses the ‘middle-blind’ status of the man from Bethsaida whom, according to Mk 8.22–26, Jesus heals in two phases. Drawing on observations from modern philosophical psychology and from ancient Greek and Jewish perspectives on vision, we argue that the two healing touches of Jesus are distinct in kind: the first restores the optical function of the eye, and the second enables cognitive synthesis of form. This reading better conforms to the narrative theme of ‘seeing but not perceiving’ than traditional interpretations, and provides the theological impetus for what has otherwise been considered a discomfiting account of Jesus’ inefficiency.
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Our paper addresses the 'middle-blind' status of the man from Bethsaida whom, according to Mk 8.22–26, Jesus heals in two phases. Drawing on observations from modern philosophical psychology and from ancient Greek and Jewish perspectives... more
Our paper addresses the 'middle-blind' status of the man from Bethsaida whom, according to Mk 8.22–26, Jesus heals in two phases. Drawing on observations from modern philosophical psychology and from ancient Greek and Jewish perspectives on vision, we argue that the two healing touches of Jesus are distinct in kind: the first restores the optical function of the eye, and the second enables cognitive synthesis of form. This reading better conforms to the narrative theme of 'seeing but not perceiving' than traditional interpretations, and provides the theological impetus for what has otherwise been considered a discomfiting account of Jesus' inefficiency.
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According to Adam Smith, when we simulate the actions of others we also evaluate their actions, and thereby sympathize with their condition. I argue that the ‘practical’ simulations of perception discussed in Smith's 'On the External... more
According to Adam Smith, when we simulate the actions of others we also evaluate their actions, and thereby sympathize with their condition. I argue that the ‘practical’ simulations of perception discussed in Smith's 'On the External Senses' (ES) share an evaluative component: guiding the body’s interaction with objects in a way that support its health and avoid its harm. Not only does such a discussion help elucidate Smith’s early thoughts about perception in ES, but how ES pre-figures and connects with his later, more developed views of morality and social interaction. It also provides a basis for connecting Smith’s account of perception with recent research in neuroscience, as I argue in this paper’s conclusion.
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Molyneux’s question, whether the newly sighted might immediately recognize tactilely familiar shapes by sight alone, has produced an array of answers over three centuries of debate and discussion. I propose the first pluralist response:... more
Molyneux’s question, whether the newly sighted might immediately recognize tactilely familiar shapes by sight alone, has produced an array of answers over three centuries of debate and discussion. I propose the first pluralist response: many different answers, both yes and no, are individually sufficient as an answer to the question as a whole. I argue that this is possible if we take the question to be cluster concept of sub-problems. This response opposes traditional answers that isolate specific perceptual features as uniquely applicable to Molyneux’s question and grant viability to only one reply. Answering Molyneux’s question as a cluster concept may also serve as a methodology for resolving other philosophical problems.
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A sensory substitution device (SSD) is a technology that translates information for one sensory modality, like vision, into information for use by another, like touch. Though SSDs have been in existence for over four decades, effective... more
A sensory substitution device (SSD) is a technology that translates information for one sensory modality, like vision, into information for use by another, like touch. Though SSDs have been in existence for over four decades, effective training techniques for their use are rarely discussed. In this paper, we compare three training strategies on a particular SSD known as the vOICe. These comparisons were conducted using a minimal but active search and localization task of luminescent discs. These studies show that an interactive training paradigm, which combines the efforts of two trainees at the same time in a tag-like game, is more effective than passive training at a computer console or active training involving search and localization of luminescent discs. This finding supports philosophical views of perception that take interaction with the environment seriously. In particular, we argue that these findings are in support of certain features of the extended mind view as proposed by Andy Clark (2008). In particular, the study suggests that when environmental conditions are responsive to one’s behavioral activity, the activity itself is enhanced, as is predicted by the extended mind view.
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Molyneux’s Question, also known as Molyneux’s Problem, became a fulcrum for early research in the epistemology of concepts, challenging common intuitions about how our concepts originate, whether sensory features differentiate concepts,... more
Molyneux’s Question, also known as Molyneux’s Problem, became a fulcrum for early research in the epistemology of concepts, challenging common intuitions about how our concepts originate, whether sensory features differentiate concepts, and how concepts are utilized in novel contexts. It was reprinted and discussed by a wide range of early modern philosophers, including Gottfried Leibniz, George Berkeley, and Adam Smith, and was perhaps the most important problem in the burgeoning discipline of psychology of the 18th Century. The question has since undergone various stages of development, both as a mental exercise and as an experimental paradigm, garnering a variety of both affirmative and negative replies in the next three centuries of debate and deliberation.
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Molyneux’s Question asks whether the once-blind might immediately recognize shapes familiar to the touch by sight alone. John Locke and other empiricists answered "not." Gottfried Leibniz was the first to publish an affirmative reply.... more
Molyneux’s Question asks whether the once-blind might immediately recognize shapes familiar to the touch by sight alone. John Locke and other empiricists answered "not." Gottfried Leibniz was the first to publish an affirmative reply. However, Leibniz’s reason for his affirmative answer has yet to be discussed directly with any depth, a lacuna this paper seeks to address. The main contention of this paper is that Leibniz cannot think that sensory representations based on the sight and touch of shape sufficient for this task, as several commentators have suggested. It is argued that Leibniz’s answer is based on the ability of the once-blind to unconsciously employ “common sensibles,” representations of shape that are independent of sight and touch.
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How does the mind attribute external causes to internal sensory experiences? Adam Smith addresses this question in his little known essay “Of the External Senses.” I closely examine Smith’s various formulations of this problem and then... more
How does the mind attribute external causes to internal sensory experiences? Adam Smith addresses this question in his little known essay “Of the External Senses.” I closely examine Smith’s various formulations of this problem and then argue for an interpretation of his solution: that inborn perceptual mechanisms automatically generate external attributions of internal experiences. I conclude by speculating that these mechanisms are best understood to operate by simulating tactile environments.
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Pluralistic Realism argues that what makes color real is both its ecological significance for a particular species and the evolutionary adapted visual system which processes it. (Matthen 2005) We argue for a more radical position, that... more
Pluralistic Realism argues that what makes color real is both its ecological significance for a particular species and the evolutionary adapted visual system which processes it. (Matthen 2005) We argue for a more radical position, that real color is dependent only on what a species determines as ecologically relevant, regardless of visual system. “Radical Pluralistic Realism” argues that real color content is processed by adaptive technologies such as Sensory Substitution Devices (SSDs)—devices that transform information accessible by one sensory modality , like vision, into another, like audition. We describe a color sonification SSD that translates colors into sounds and argue that subjects wearing this device actually hear color because they process real color content. even though they do not experience it as such.
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Effective training techniques for sensory substitution devices (SSDs), devices that translate information for one sensory modality into information that can be used by another, are rarely discussed. In this paper, we compare three... more
Effective training techniques for sensory substitution devices (SSDs), devices that translate information for one sensory modality into information that can be used by another, are rarely discussed. In this paper, we compare three training strategies on a particular SSD, known as the vOICe, in a minimal search and localization task and show that an interactive paradigm, which combines the efforts of two trainees at the same time in a tag-like game, is more effective than passive training at a computer console or active training involving search and localization of luminescent discs. This finding suggests support for philosophical views of perception that take interaction with the environment seriously. In particular, we argue that these findings are in support of the embodied mind view as proposed by Andy Clark (2008).
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In this dissertation I argue that some of our visual and tactile experiences of the external world are exhausted by spatial content. For instance, some of our visual experiences of shape are not ‘colored in’, but are seen as just shapes... more
In this dissertation I argue that some of our visual and tactile experiences of the external world are exhausted by spatial content. For instance, some of our visual experiences of shape are not ‘colored in’, but are seen as just shapes out in the external world — what I call “spatial experience”. This provides grounds for sensory knowledge of objects in the external world which is not corrupted by sense-specific content like color and texture.
The possibility of spatial experience resolves the three-century old problem known as Molyneux’s question: whether the newly sighted recognize tactilely familiar shapes by sight alone. Given the resounding evidence from Developmental Science in support of an affirmative answer to Molyneux’s question, the question has changed from ‘whether’ to how the newly sighted recognize the shapes. I answer that the newly sighted are able to recognize the shapes because they have spatial experiences of them — the same type of experiences of shape by sight and touch.
I set my answer in the context of other plausible affirmative answers given by Leibniz, Adam Smith, Gareth Evans, Jesse Prinz, and John Campbell. I argue that these answers fail to guarantee that newly sighted subjects actually experience this sameness and thereby recognize the shapes as the same. These answers only provide possible bases for the sameness of the shape properties of visual and tactile shape perception or the basis for how different shape properties might connect up. Only recognition of shapes based on spatial experience guarantees an affirmative answer to Molyneux’s Question.
The possibility of spatial experience resolves the three-century old problem known as Molyneux’s question: whether the newly sighted recognize tactilely familiar shapes by sight alone. Given the resounding evidence from Developmental Science in support of an affirmative answer to Molyneux’s question, the question has changed from ‘whether’ to how the newly sighted recognize the shapes. I answer that the newly sighted are able to recognize the shapes because they have spatial experiences of them — the same type of experiences of shape by sight and touch.
I set my answer in the context of other plausible affirmative answers given by Leibniz, Adam Smith, Gareth Evans, Jesse Prinz, and John Campbell. I argue that these answers fail to guarantee that newly sighted subjects actually experience this sameness and thereby recognize the shapes as the same. These answers only provide possible bases for the sameness of the shape properties of visual and tactile shape perception or the basis for how different shape properties might connect up. Only recognition of shapes based on spatial experience guarantees an affirmative answer to Molyneux’s Question.
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I'm inclined to think that love has little to do with commitment or choice or anything that requires a dutiful decision on our part, and more to do with a feeling that sweeps us up with little warning or guidance.
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Our paper addresses the ‘middle-blind’ status of the man from Bethsaida whom, according to Mk 8.22–26, Jesus heals in two phases. Drawing on observations from modern philosophical psychology and from ancient Greek theories of vision, we... more
Our paper addresses the ‘middle-blind’ status of the man from Bethsaida whom, according to Mk 8.22–26, Jesus heals in two phases. Drawing on observations from modern philosophical psychology and from ancient Greek theories of vision, we argue that the two healing touches of Jesus are distinct in kind: the first restores optical function of the eye, and the second enables cognitive synthesis of form. This reading better conforms to the narrative theme of ‘seeing but not perceiving’ than traditional interpretations, and provides the theological impetus behind what has otherwise been considered a discomfiting account of Jesus’ inefficiency.
Research Interests:
Might the perception of real color include stimuli from any sensory system whose input was within the visible and near-visible spectrum? For instance, might color content be processed by an auditory system with color receptors? I argue... more
Might the perception of real color include stimuli from any sensory system whose input was within the visible and near-visible spectrum? For instance, might color content be processed by an auditory system with color receptors? I argue that subjects wearing a color sonification device that processes color content using the auditory system hear real color much like a parrot or a human sees real color, a view called, “Radical Pluralistic Realism”. What makes it radical is that, unlike Mohan Matthen’s (2005) view, color content can be processed by a visual system that did not evolve out of processes relevant to an ecological niche.
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I review Mike Hill and Warren Montag's, The Other Adam Smith: Popular Contention, Commercial Society, and the Birth of Necro-Economics. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.
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The claims of Plantinga and Behe are objectionable to scientific inquiry. Their analysis fails to acknowledge the past success of evolutionary biology in accounting for complex natural systems without design. Because of this, they promote... more
The claims of Plantinga and Behe are objectionable to scientific inquiry. Their analysis fails to acknowledge the past success of evolutionary biology in accounting for complex natural systems without design. Because of this, they promote a science that is not disposed to provide an account of the origin of complex systems that aligns with the strategies utilized for enjoying these past successes. This failure is also specific to Plantinga’s book, which does little in the way of engaging the numerous arguments against intelligent design.
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Many linguists and philosophers of language inspect the structure of talk to understand the nature of thought. Others, like Jeffrey King, claim that the structure of talk is a window to the nature of reality itself.
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Philosophers are flummoxed by hallucinations. You should be too.